We study multiplayer quantitative reachability games played on a finite directed graph, where the objective of each player is to reach his target set of vertices as quickly as possible. Instead of the well-known notion of Nash equilibrium (NE), we focus on the notion of subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE), a refinement of NE well-suited in the framework of games played on graphs. It is known that there always exists an SPE in quantitative reachability games and that the constrained existence problem is decidable. We here prove that this problem is PSPACE-complete. To obtain this result, we propose a new algorithm that iteratively builds a set of constraints characterizing the set of SPE outcomes in quantitative reachability games. This set of constraints is obtained by iterating an operator that reinforces the constraints up to obtaining a fixpoint. With this fixpoint, the set of SPE outcomes can be represented by a finite graph of size at most exponential. A careful inspection of the computation allows us to establish PSPACE membership.
Introduction
While two-player zero-sum games played on graphs are the most studied model to formalize and solve the reactive synthesis problem [25] , recent work has considered non-zero-sum extensions of this mathematical framework, see e.g. [15, 19, 7, 21, 6, 5, 17, 4, 1] , see also the surveys [20, 3, 13] . In the zero-sum game approach, the system and the environment are considered as monolithic and fully adversarial entities. Unfortunately, both assumptions may turn to be too strong. First, the reactive system may be composed of several components that execute concurrently and have their own purpose. So, it is natural to model such systems with multiplayer games with each player having his own objective. Second, the environment usually has its own objective too, and this objective is usually not the negation of the objective of the reactive system as postulated in the zero-sum case. Therefore, there are instances of the reactive synthesis problem for which no solution exists in the zero-sum setting, i.e. no winning strategy for the system against a completely antagonistic environment, while there exists a strategy for the system which enforces the desired properties against all rational behaviors of the environment pursuing its own objective.
While the central solution concept in zero-sum games is the notion of winning strategy, it is well known that this solution concept is not sufficient to reason about non-zero-sum games. In non-zero-sum games, notions of equilibria are used to reason about the rational behavior of players. The celebrated notion of Nash equilibrium (NE) [23] is one of the most studied. A profile of strategies is an NE if no player has an incentive to deviate, i.e. change his strategy and obtain a better reward, when this player knows that the other players will be playing their respective strategies in the profile. A well-known weakness of NE in sequential games, which include infinite duration games played on graphs, is that they are subject to non-credible threats: decisions in subgames that are irrational and used to threaten the other players and oblige them to follow a given behavior. To avoid this problem, the concept of subgame perfect equilibria (SPE) has been proposed, see e.g. [24] . SPEs are NEs with the additional property that they are also NEs in all subgames of the original game. While it is now quite well understood how to handle NEs algorithmically in games played on graphs [27, 28, 12, 17] , this is not the case for SPEs.
Contributions
In this paper, we provide an algorithm to decide in polynomial space the constrained existence problem for SPEs in quantitative reachability games. A quantitative reachability game is played by n players on a finite graph in which each player has his own reachability objective. The objective of each player is to reach his target set of vertices as quickly as possible. In a series of papers, it has been shown that SPEs always exist in quantitative reachability games [8] , and that the set of outcomes of SPEs in a quantitative reachability game is a regular language which is effectively constructible [11] . As a consequence of the latter result, the constrained existence problem for SPEs is decidable.
Unfortunately, the proof that establishes the regularity of the set of possible outcomes of SPEs in [11] exploits a well-quasi order for proving termination and it cannot be used to obtain a good upper bound on the complexity for the algorithm. Here, we propose a new algorithm and we show that this set of outcomes can be represented using an automaton of size at most exponential. It follows that the constrained existence problem for SPEs can be decided in PSPACE. We also provide a matching lower-bound showing that this problem is PSPACE-complete.
Our new algorithm iteratively builds a set of constraints that exactly characterize the set of SPEs in quantitative reachability games. This set of constraints is obtained by iterating an operator that reinforces the constraints up to obtaining a fixpoint. A careful inspection of the computation allows us to establish PSPACE membership.
Related work Algorithms to reason on NEs in graph games are studied in [27] for ω-regular objectives and in [28, 12] for quantitative objectives. Algorithms to reason on SPEs are given in [26] for ω-regular objectives. Quantitative reachability objectives are not ω-regular objectives. Reasoning about NEs and SPEs for ω-regular specifications can also be done using strategy logics [16, 22] .
Other notions of rationality and their use for reactive synthesis have been studied in the literature: rational synthesis in cooperative [19] and adversarial [21] setting, and their algorithmic complexity has been studied in [17] . Extensions with imperfect information have been investigated in [18] . Synthesis rules based on the notion of admissible strategies have been studied in [2, 7, 6, 5, 4, 1] . Weak SPEs have been studied in [11, 14, 9] and shown to be equivalent to SPEs for quantitative reachability objectives.
for each i ∈ Π and each ρ = ρ 0 ρ 1 . . . ∈ Plays, Cost i (ρ) is equal to the least index k such that ρ k ∈ F i , and to +∞ if no such index exists.
In the sequel of this document, we simply call such a game a reachability game. Notice that the cost function used for reachability games can be supposed to be continuous in the following sense [8] . With V endowed with the discrete topology and V ω with the product topology, a sequence of plays (ρ n ) n∈N converges to ρ if every prefix of ρ is a prefix of all ρ n except, possibly, finitely many of them. A cost function Cost i is continuous if whenever lim n→+∞ ρ n = ρ, we have that lim n→+∞ Cost i (ρ n ) = Cost i (ρ). In reachability games, the function Cost i can be transformed into a continuous one as follows: Cost A strategy profile is a tuple σ = (σ i ) i∈Π of strategies, one for each player. It is called positional (resp. finite-memory) if for all i ∈ Π, σ i is positional (resp. finite-memory). Given an initialized game (G, v 0 ) and a strategy profile σ, there exists an unique play from v 0 consistent with each strategy σ i . We call this play the outcome of σ and it is denoted by σ v0 . Let c = (c i ) i∈Π ∈ (N ∪ {+∞}) |Π| , we say that σ is a strategy profile with cost c or that σ v0 has cost c if c i = Cost i ( σ v0 ) for all i ∈ Π.
Solution concepts and constraint problem
In the multiplayer game setting, the solution concepts usually studied are equilibria (see [20] ). We here recall the concepts of Nash equilibrium and subgame perfect equilibrium.
Let σ = (σ i ) i∈Π be a strategy profile in an initialized game (G, v 0 ). When we highlight the role of player i, we denote σ by (σ i , σ −i ) where σ −i is the profile (σ j ) j∈Π\{i} . A strategy σ ′ i = σ i is a deviating strategy of player i, and it is a profitable deviation for him if
The notion of Nash equilibrium is classical: a strategy profile σ in an initialized game (G, v 0 ) is a Nash equilibrium (NE) if no player has an incentive to deviate unilaterally from his strategy, i.e. no player has a profitable deviation. Formally, σ is an NE if for each i ∈ Π and each deviating strategy σ When considering games played on graphs, a useful refinement of NE is the concept of subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) which is a strategy profile being an NE in each subgame. It is well-known that contrarily to NEs, SPEs avoid non-credible threats [20] . Formally, given a quantitative game G = (G, Cost), an initial vertex v 0 , and a history hv ∈ Hist(v 0 ), the initialized game (G ↾h , v) is called a subgame of (G, v 0 ) such that G ↾h = (G, Cost ↾h ) and Cost i↾h (ρ) = Cost i (hρ) for all i ∈ Π and ρ ∈ V ω . Notice that (G, v 0 ) is subgame of itself. Moreover if σ i is a strategy for player i in (G, v 0 ), then σ i↾h denotes the strategy in (G ↾h , v) Figure 1 A quantitative reachability game: player 1 (resp. player 2) owns circle (resp. square) vertices and F1 = {v2} and F2 = {v2, v5}.
such that for all histories h
. Similarly, from a strategy profile σ in (G, v 0 ), we derive the strategy profile σ ↾h in (G ↾h , v).
It is proved in [8] that there always exists an SPE in reachability games. In this paper, we are interested in solving the following constraint problem.
◮ Definition 3 (Constraint problem). Given (G, v 0 ) an initialized reachability game and two threshold vectors x, y ∈ (N ∪ {+∞})
|Π| , the constraint problem is to decide whether there exists an SPE in (G, v 0 ) with cost c such that
Our main result is the following one:
◮ Theorem 4. The constraint problem for initialized reachability games is PSPACE-complete.
The sequel of the paper is devoted to the proof of this result. Let us first illustrate the introduced concepts with an example.
◮ Example 5.
A reachability game G = (G, (F i ) i∈Π , (Cost i ) i∈Π ) with two players is depicted in Figure 1 . The circle vertices are owned by player 1 whereas the square vertices are owned by player 2. The target sets of both players are respectively equal to F 1 = {v 2 } (grey vertices), F 2 = {v 2 , v 5 } (double circled vertices).
The positional strategy profile σ = (σ 1 , σ 2 ) is depicted by double arrows, its outcome
ω with cost (4, 4) . Let us explain that σ is an NE. Player 1 reaches his target set as soon as possible and has thus no incentive to deviate. Player 2 has no profitable deviation that allows him to reach v 5 . For instance if he uses a deviating positional strategy σ
ω with cost (+∞, +∞) which is not profitable for player 2. One can verify that the strategy profile σ is also an SPE. For instance in the subgame
ω such that Cost ↾h (ρ) = Cost(hρ) = (8, 2) . In this subgame, with ρ, both players reach their target set as soon as possible and have thus no incentive to deviate.
Consider now the positional strategy profile σ
ω with cost (+∞, +∞). Let us explain that σ ′ is an NE. On one hand, since player 2 never goes to v 1 , player 1 has no incentive to deviate, as his target is only accessible from v 1 . On the other hand, if player 2 deviates and chooses to go to v 1 , his cost is still +∞ since player 1 goes to v 3 . However, the strategy profile σ ′ is not an SPE. Indeed, it features an non-credible threat by player 1: consider the history v 0 v 1 and the corresponding subgame (G ↾v0 , v 1 ). In that case, player 1 has an incentive to deviate to reach v 2 to yield a cost of 4. Thus, the strategy profile σ ′ ↾v0
is not a NE in the subgame (G ↾v0 , v 1 ), and thus is not an SPE in (G, v 0 ). ◭
Weak SPE, very weak SPE and extended game
In this section, we present two important tools that will be repeatedly used in the sequel. First, we explain that in reachability games, the notion of SPE can be replaced by the simpler notion of very weak SPE. Second we present an extended version of a reachability game where the vertices are enriched with the set of players that have already visited their target sets along a history. Working with this extended game is essential to prove that the constraint problem for reachability games is in PSPACE. We begin by recalling the concepts of weak and very weak SPE introduced in [11, 14] . Let (G, v 0 ) be an initialized game and σ = (σ i ) i∈Π be a strategy profile. Given i ∈ Π, we say that a strategy σ A strategy profile σ is a weak NE (resp. very weak NE) in (G, v 0 ) if, for each player i ∈ Π, for each finitely deviating (resp. one-shot) strategy σ
From the given definitions, every SPE is a weak SPE, and every weak SPE is a very weak SPE. It is known that weak SPE and very weak SPE are equivalent notions and that there exist initialized games that have a weak SPE but no SPE; nevertheless, all three concepts are equivalent for initialized reachability games [11, 14] .
◮ Proposition 6 ([11, 14]). Let (G, v 0 ) be a initialized reachability game and σ be a strategy profile in (G, v 0 ). Then σ is an SPE if and only if σ is a weak SPE if and only if σ is a very weak SPE.
Let us now recall the notion of extended game for a given reachability game G (see e.g. [9] ). The vertices (v, I) of the extended game store a vertex v ∈ V as well as a subset I ⊆ Π of players that have already visited their target sets.
◮ Definition 7 (Extended game). Let G = (G, (F i ) i∈Π , (Cost i ) i∈Π ) be a reachability game with an arena G = (Π, V, (V i ) i∈Π , E), and let v 0 be an initial vertex. The extended game of G is equal to X = (X, ( 
Notice the way each target set
). In the sequel, to avoid heavy notations, each cost function Cost X i will be simply written as Cost i . The extended game of the reachability game of Figure 1 is depicted in Figure 2 . We will come back to this example at the end of this section.
Let us state some properties of the extended game. First, notice that for each ρ = (v 0 , I 0 )(v 1 , I 1 ) . . . ∈ Plays X (x 0 ), we have the next property called I-monotonicity:
Second, given an initialized game (G, v 0 ) and its extended game (X , x 0 ), there is a oneto-one correspondence between plays in Plays G (v 0 ) and plays in Plays X (x 0 ):
Third, given ρ ∈ Plays G (v 0 ), we have that Cost(ρ X ) = Cost(ρ), and conversely given ρ ∈ Plays X (x 0 ), we have that Cost(ρ G ) = Cost(ρ). It follows that outcomes of SPE can be equivalently studied in (G, v 0 ) and in (X , x 0 ), as stated in the next lemma.
◮ Lemma 8. If ρ is the outcome of an SPE in
X is the outcome of an SPE in (X , x 0 ) with the same cost. Conversely, if ρ is the outcome of an SPE in (X , x 0 ), then ρ G is the outcome of an SPE in (G, v 0 ) with the same cost.
By construction, the arena X of the initialized extended game is divided into different regions according to the players who have already visited their target set. Let us provide some useful notions with respect to this decomposition. We will often use them in the following sections. Let I = {I ⊆ Π | there exists v ∈ V such that (v, I) ∈ Succ * (x 0 )} be the set of sets I accessible from the initial state x 0 , and let N = |I| be its size. For
) ∈ E X , we say that I ′ is a successor of I and we write I ′ ∈ Succ(I). Given I ∈ I, X I = (V I , E I ) refers to the sub-arena of X restricted to the vertices {(v, I) ∈ V X | v ∈ V }. We say that X I is the region 1 associated with I. Such a region X I is called a bottom region whenever Succ(I) = ∅. There exists a partial order on I such that I < I ′ if and only if I ′ ∈ Succ * (I) \ {I}. We fix an arbitrary total order on I that extends this partial order < as follows:
(with X JN a bottom region). 2 With respect to this total order, given n ∈ {1, . . . , N }, we denote by X ≥Jn = (V ≥Jn , E ≥Jn ) the sub-arena of X restricted to the vertices
The total order given in (2) together with the I-monotonicity (see (1) ) leads to the following lemma. ◮ Lemma 9 (Region decomposition and section). Let π be a (finite or infinite) path in X . Then there exists a region decomposition of π as Figure 2 (only the part reachable from the initial vertex x 0 = (v 0 , ∅) is depicted; for the moment the reader should not consider the labeling indicated 1 In the sequel, we indifferently call region either X I , or V I , or I. 2 We use notation Jn, n ∈ {1, . . . , N }, to avoid any confusion with the sets I k appearing in a play under or next to the vertices). As we can see, the extended game is divided into three different regions: one region associated to I = ∅ that contains the initial vertex x 0 , a second region associated to I = {2}, and a third bottom region associated to I = {1, 2}. Hence the set I = {∅, {2}, Π} is totally ordered as 
ω ∈ Plays G (v 0 ) and cost (4, 4), we derive the SPE outcome ρ X ∈ Plays X (x 0 ) equal to
with the same cost (4, 4) . The region decomposition of ρ X is equal to ρ
is empty, and ρ
◭

Characterization
In this section, given an initialized reachability game (G, v 0 ), we characterize the set of plays that are outcomes of SPEs, and we provide an algorithm to construct this set. For this characterization, by Lemma 8, we can work on the extended game (X , x 0 ) instead of (G, v 0 ). Moreover by Proposition 6, we can focus on very weak SPEs only since they are equivalent to SPEs. Such a characterization already appears in [11] however with a different algorithm that cannot be used to obtain good complexity upper bounds for the constraint problem. All along this section, when we refer to a vertex of V X , we use notation v (instead of (u, I)) and notation I(v) means the second component I of this vertex.
Our algorithm iteratively builds a set of constraints imposed by a labeling function λ : V X → N ∪ {+∞} such that the plays of the extended game satisfying those constraints are exactly the SPE outcomes. Let us provide a formal definition of such a function λ with the constraints that it imposes on plays.
◮ Definition 11 (λ-consistent play). Let X be the extended game of a reachability game G, and λ : V X → N ∪ {+∞} be a labeling function. Given v ∈ V X , for all plays ρ ∈ Plays X (v), we say that ρ = ρ 0 ρ 1 . . . is λ-consistent if for all n ∈ N and i ∈ Π such that ρ n ∈ V i :
We denote by Λ(v) the set of plays ρ ∈ Plays X (v) that are λ-consistent.
Thus, a play ρ is λ-consistent if for all its suffixes ρ ≥n , if player i owns ρ n then the number of edges to reach his target set along ρ ≥n is bounded by λ(ρ n ). Before going into the details of our algorithm, let us intuitively explain on an example how a well-chosen labeling function characterizes the set of SPE outcomes.
◮ Example 12. We consider the extended game (X , x 0 ) of Figure 2 , and a labeling function λ whose values are indicated under or next to each vertex.
is labeled by λ(v) = c, then if c ∈ N 0 , this means that player i will only accept outcomes in (X , v) that reach his target set within c steps, otherwise he would have a profitable deviation. If λ(v) = 0, this means that player i has already reached his target set, and if λ(v) = +∞, player i has no profitable deviation whatever outcome is proposed to him.
In Example 10 was given the SPE outcome equal to Recall now the strategy profile σ ′ with outcome ρ
′ is not λ-consistent since player 2 does not reach his target set, and so in particular he does not reach his target set within 4 steps. We already know that σ ′ is not an SPE from Example 5. In fact all the profiles that yield ρ ′ as an outcome are not SPEs. ◭ Our algorithm roughly works as follows: the labeling function λ that characterizes the set of SPE outcomes is obtained from an initial labeling function that imposes no constraints, by iterating an operator that reinforces the constraints step after step, up to obtaining a fixpoint which is the required function λ. Thus, if λ k is the labeling function computed at step k and Λ k (v), v ∈ V X , the related sets of λ k -consistent plays, initially we have Λ 0 (v) = Plays X (v), and step by step, the constraints imposed by λ k become stronger and the sets Λ k (v) become smaller, until a fixpoint is reached. Initially, we want a labeling function λ 0 that imposes no constraint on the plays. We could define λ 0 as the constant function +∞. We proceed a little bit differently. Indeed recall the definition of the target sets (F 
for all n ≥ k. It follows that for all n ≥ k, Cost i (ρ ≥n ) = 0 and the inequality (3) is trivially true. (See also Example 12.) Therefore we define the labeling function λ 0 as follows.
Let us now explain how our algorithm computes the labeling functions λ k , k ≥ 1, and the related sets Λ k (v), v ∈ V X . It works in a bottom-up manner, according to the total order J 1 < J 2 < . . . < J N of I given in (2): it first iteratively updates the labeling function for all vertices v of the arena X JN until reaching a fixpoint in this arena, it then repeats this procedure in X ≥JN−1 , X ≥JN−2 , . . ., X ≥J1 = X. Hence, suppose that we currently treat the arena X ≥Jn and that we want to compute λ k+1 from λ k . We define the updated function λ k+1 as follows (we use the convention that 1 + (+∞) = +∞).
◮ Definition 15 (Labeling update). Let k ≥ 0 and suppose that we treat the arena
Let us provide some explanations. As this update concerns the arena X ≥Jn , we keep λ k+1 = λ k outside of this arena. Suppose now that v belongs to the arena X ≥Jn and v ∈ V X i . We define λ k+1 (v) = 0 whenever i ∈ I(v) (as already explained for the definition of λ 0 ). When it is updated, the value λ k+1 (v) represents what is the best cost that player i can ensure for himself with a "one-shot" choice by only taking into account plays of Λ k (v ′ ) with v ′ ∈ Succ(v). Notice that it makes sense to run the algorithm in a bottom-up fashion according to the total ordering J 1 < . . . < J N since given a play ρ = ρ 0 ρ 1 . . ., if ρ 0 is a vertex of V ≥Jn , then for all k ∈ N, ρ k is a vertex of V ≥Jn (by I-monotonicity). Moreover running the algorithm in this way is essential to prove that the constraint problem for reachability games is in PSPACE.
◮ Example 16. We consider again the extended game (X , x 0 ) of Figure 2 with the total order
Let us illustrate Definition 15 on the arena X ≥J2 . Let k > 0 and suppose that the labeling function λ k has been computed such that λ
is not the labeling indicated in Figure 2 ). Let us show how to compute λ k+1 (v 0 , J 2 ). We need to compute sup{Cost
consists only of the plays that go to (v 6 , J 2 ), as any play that goes to (v 3 , J 2 ) has at least cost 6 for player 1. All the plays in Λ k (v 1 , J 2 ) have cost 3 for player 1 and player 2. Thus,
Hence, the minimum is attained with successor (v 1 , J 2 ), and
We can now provide our algorithm that computes the sequence (λ k (v)) k∈N until a fixpoint is reached (see Proposition 17 below). Initially, the labeling function is λ 0 (see Definition 13) . For the next steps k > 0, we begin with the bottom region X JN of X and update λ k−1 to λ k as described in Definition 15. At some point, the values of λ k do not change anymore in X JN and (λ k ) k∈N reaches locally (on X JN ) a fixpoint (see again Proposition 17). Now, we consider the arena X ≥JN−1 and in the same way, we continue to update locally the values of λ k in X ≥JN−1 . We repeat this procedure with arenas X ≥JN−2 , X ≥JN−3 , ... until the arena X ≥J1 = X is completely processed. From the last computed λ k , we derive the sets Λ k (v), v ∈ V X , that we need for the characterization of outcomes of SPEs (see Theorem 20 below). An example illustrating the execution of this algorithm is given at the end of this section.
We now state that the sequence (λ k ) k∈N computed by this algorithm reaches a fixpoint -locally on each arena X ≥Jn and globally on X -in the following meaning:
◮ Proposition 17. There exists a sequence of integers
The global fixpoint λ k * is also simply denoted by λ * , and the set Λ
This proposition indicates that Algorithm 1 terminates. Indeed for each J n ∈ I, taking the least index k * n which makes Equality (4) true shows that the repeat loop is broken and the variable n decremented by 1. The value n = 0 is eventually reached and the algorithm stops with the global fixpoint λ * . Notice that the first local fixpoint is reached with k * N = 0 because X JN is a bottom region. Proposition 17 also shows that when a local fixpoint is reached in the arena X ≥Jn+1 and the algorithm updates the labeling function λ k in the arena X ≥Jn , the values of λ k (v) do not change anymore for any v ∈ V ≥Jn+1 but can still be modified for some v ∈ V Jn . Recall also that outside of X ≥Jn , the values of λ k (v) are still equal to the initial values λ 0 (v). These properties will be useful when we will prove that the constraint problem for reachability games is in PSPACE. They are summarized in the next lemma.
◮ Lemma 18. Let k ∈ N be a step of the algorithm and let
To prove Proposition 17, we have to prove that the sequences (λ
Proof. Let us prove by induction on
We will get that (5) is proved. It remains to prove this assertion when i ∈ I(v). (5) is true for k and let us prove it for k+1. We know by induction hypothesis that for all v
, and thus also
Let us prove that for all
By (6), it follows that
And so, the assertion again holds. ◭
We can now prove Proposition 17.
Proof of Proposition 17.
The base case is easily proved. As V JN is a bottom region, we
JN , and thus the local fixpoint is immediately reached on
. Let J n be a element of I, with n ∈ {1, . . . , N − 1}. Suppose that a fixpoint has been reached in the arena X ≥Jn+1 and that the labeling function λ k is udpated on the arena X ≥Jn as described in Definition 15. Recall that the previously computed values of λ k do no longer change on X ≥Jn+1 (a fixpoint is reached) and they do not change outside of V ≥Jn (by construction). However they can be modified on X Jn . In this region 
. This equality also holds for all v ∈ V ≥Jn (and not only for V Jn ), and it follows that for all m ∈ N and all v ∈ V ≥Jn , λ
Notice that when n is decremented in Algorithm 1, k is incremented at least once showing that the sequence 0 < k *
* is strictly increasing. Finally, the last arena processed by the algorithm is X ≥J1 = X. So with k
We are ready to state how we characterize plays that are outcomes of SPEs. This is possible with the fixpoint computed by Algorithm 1.
Notice that this theorem also provides a characterization of the outcomes of SPEs in (G, v 0 ) by Lemma 8.
The two implications of Theorem 20 respectively follow from Proposition 23 and Proposition 24 given below. We first need to establish an important property satisfied by the sets Λ k (v): when for some player i, the costs Cost i (ρ) associated with the plays ρ in Λ k (v) are unbounded, there actually exists a play in this set that has an infinite cost. In other terms, either Λ k (v) contains at least one play ρ with an infinite cost Cost i (ρ) or there exists a finite maximal cost for all ρ in Λ k (v).
◮ Proposition 21.
For every k ∈ N, for every v ∈ V X and for every i ∈ Π, the following implication holds:
This will establish Proposition 21. We prove by induction on t with 0 Lemma 19 . Moreover by induction hypothesis we have ρ ∈ Λ t−1 (v). It follows that there exists m ∈ N and j ∈ Π with ρ m ∈ V j such that
v). Let t > 0 and assume that the assertion is true for
In particular, λ t (ρ m ) < λ t−1 (ρ m ) and thus λ t (ρ m ) < +∞, and player j does not reach his target set along π = ρ 0 . . . ρ m . . . ρ m+λ t (ρm) . We choose n ℓ large enough such that ρ and ρ n ℓ share a common prefix of length at least |π|.
The next corollary is a direct consequence of Proposition 21 with the convention that the max belongs to N ∪ {+∞}.
The two implications of Theorem 20 are proved in the following Proposition 23 and Proposition 24.
Proof. Suppose that σ is an SPE in (X , x 0 ) and let us prove by induction on k that for all k ∈ N and all hv ∈ Hist X (x 0 ),
For case k = 0, this is true by definition of Λ 0 (v) and Lemma 14. Suppose that this assertion is satisfied for k ≥ 0 and by contradiction, assume that there exists hv ∈ Hist X (x 0 ) such that σ ↾h v ∈ Λ k+1 (v). Let ρ = σ ↾h v , by Definition 11, it means that there exist n ∈ N and i ∈ Π such that ρ n ∈ V i and
But by induction hypothesis, we know that
It follows by (7) and (8) 
In regards of Definition 15, these three relations allow us to conclude that
Let h ′ = hρ 0 . . . ρ n−1 ∈ Hist X (x 0 ), and let us define the one-shot deviating strategy
This proves that σ is not a very weak SPE and so not an SPE by Proposition 6, which is a contradiction. This concludes the proof.
Proof. We show how to construct a very weak SPE σ (and so an SPE by Proposition 6) with outcome ρ in (X , x 0 ). We define σ step by step by induction on the subgames of (X , x 0 ). We first partially build σ such as it produces ρ, i.e., σ x0 = ρ. Now, we define a set of plays which will is useful to define σ in the subgames. For all ( 
Notice that such a play exists by Corollary 22. The construction of σ is done by induction as follows. Consider hvv
We extend the definition of σ as follows:
Let us prove that σ is a very weak SPE. Consider the subgame (X ↾h , v) for a given hv ∈ Hist X (x 0 ) with v ∈ V X i and the one-shot deviating strategy σ
We have that ρ = σ ↾h v is suffix of ρ j,u , that is, ρ = ρ j,u,≥n for some n ∈ N and that (10) and the fixpoint). It follows that: Table 1 The different steps of the algorithm computing λ * for the extended game of Figure 2 We now prove that σ ′ i is not a one-shot profitable deviation by proving that
This concludes the proof. ◭ ◮ Example 25. Let us come back to the running example of Figure 2 . The different steps of Algorithm 1 are given in Table 1 . The columns indicate the vertices according to their region, respectively Π, {2}, and ∅. Notice that for the region Π, we only write one column v as for all vertices (v, Π) the value of λ is equal to 0 all along the algorithm.
The algorithm begins with the arena
is immediately reached because all vertices belong to the target set of both players in X J3 . Thus the first local fixpoint is reached with k * 3 = 0. The algorithm then treats the arena X ≥J2 . By Lemma 18, it is enough to consider the region X J2 . Let us explain how to compute λ
As the unique successor of v is (v 2 , {1, 2}), all λ 1 -consistent plays beginning in this successor have cost 0. So, we have that λ 2 (v) = 1. For the computation of λ 2 (v 6 , {2}), the same argument holds since (v 6 , {2}) has the unique successor (v 7 , {2}). The vertex (v 1 , {2}) has two successors: (v 6 , {2}) and (v 3 , {2}). Again, we know that all λ 1 -consistent plays beginning in (v 6 , {2}) have cost 2. From (v 3 , {2}) however, one can easily check that the play (v 3 , {2})(v 0 , {2})((v 4 , {2})) ω is λ 1 -consistent and has cost +∞ for player 1. Thus, we obtain that λ 2 (v 1 , {2}) = 3. For the other vertices of X J2 , one can see that λ 2 (v) = λ 1 (v). Finally, we can check that the local fixed point is reached in the arena X ≥J2 (resp. X ≥J1 ) with λ 3 = λ 2 (resp. λ 6 = λ 5 = λ * ). Therefore the respective fixpoints are reached with k * 2 = 2 and k * 1 = 5. The labeling function indicated in Figure 2 is the one of λ * . ◭
Counter graph
In the previous section, we have introduced the concept of labeling function λ and the constraints that it imposes on plays. We have also proposed an algorithm that computes a sequence of labeling functions (λ k ) k∈N until reaching a fixpoint λ * such that the plays that are λ * -consistent are exactly the SPE outcomes. In this section, given a labeling function λ, we introduce the concept of counter graph such that its infinite paths coincide with the plays that are λ-consistent. We then show that the counter graph associated with the fixpoint function λ * has an exponential size, an essential step to prove PSPACE membership of the constraint problem.
For the entire section, we fix a reachability game
be its associated extended game. Furthermore, when we speak about a play ρ we always mean a play in the extended game X .
A labeling function λ give constraints on costs of plays from each vertex in X, albeit only for the player that owns this vertex. However, by the property of λ-consistence, constraints for a player carry over all the successive vertices, whether they belong to him or not. In order to check efficiently this property, we introduce the counter graph to keep track explicitly of the accumulation of constraints for all players at each step of a play. Let us first fix some notation.
◮ Definition 26 (Restriction and maximal finite range). Let
We consider restrictions of λ to sub-arenas of V X as follows. Let n ∈ {1, . . . , N }, we denote by λ n : V Jn → N ∪ {+∞} the restriction of λ to V Jn . Similarly we denote by λ ≥n (resp. λ >n ) the restriction of λ to V ≥Jn (resp. V >Jn . The maximal finite range of λ, denoted by mR(λ), is equal to
with the convention that mR(λ) = 0 if λ is the constant function +∞. We also extend this notion to restrictions of λ with the convention that mR(λ >n ) = 0 if J n is a bottom region.
Notice that in the definition of maximal finite range, we only consider the finite values of λ (and not the value +∞).
and c i > 1.
Intuitively, the counter graph is constructed such that once a value λ(v) is finite for a vertex v ∈ V X i along a play in X , the corresponding path in C(λ) keeps track of the induced constraint by (i) decrementing the counter value c i for the concerned player i by 1 at every step, (ii) updating this counter if a stronger constraint for player i is encountered by visiting a vertex v ′ with a smaller value λ(v ′ ), and (iii) setting the counter c i to 0 if player i has reached his target set.
Note that in the counter graph, there may be some vertices with no outgoing edges. Indeed, consider a vertex (v, (c i ) i∈Π ) ∈ V C such that c j = 1 for some player j. By construction of C(λ), the only outgoing edges from (v, (c i ) i∈Π ) must link to vertices (v ′ , (c
. However, it may be the case that no successor v ′ of v in X is such that j ∈ I(v ′ ). Note as well that for each vertex v ∈ V X , there exist many different vertices (v, (c i ) i∈Π ) in C(λ), one for each counter values profile. However, the intended goal of the counter graph is to monitor explicitly the constraints accumulated by each player along a play in X regarding the function λ. Thus, we will only consider paths in C(λ) that start in vertices (v, (c i ) i∈Π ) such that the counter values correspond indeed to the constraint at the beginning of a play in X regarding λ:
We call v C the starting vertex associated with v, and denote by SV(λ) the set of all starting vertices in C(λ).
◮ Example 29. Recall the extended game (X , x 0 ) of Figure 2 , and the labeling function λ whose values are indicated under or next to each vertex. In Example 12, we have shown that the play ∅, (3, 3) ) and that
Recall now the play ρ
, there is an edge to (v 4 , ∅, (+∞, 3)), then to (v 0 , ∅, (+∞, 2)) and to (v 4 , ∅, (+∞, 1)). For the latter vertex, there is no outgoing edge back to (v 0 , ∅, (+∞, 0)) because 2 / ∈ I(v 0 ). Therefore there is no infinite path starting in
There exists a correspondence between λ-consistent plays in X and infinite paths from starting vertices in C(λ) in the following way. On one hand, every play ρ in X that is not λ-consistent does not appear in the counter graph: the first constraint regarding λ that is violated along ρ is reflected by a vertex in C(λ) with a counter value getting to 1 and no outgoing edges. On the other hand, λ-consistent plays in X have a corresponding infinite path in the counter graph C(λ). This correspondence is formalized in the two following lemmas:
◮ Lemma 30. Let ρ = ρ 0 ρ 1 . . . be a play in Plays X (v). Then there exists an associated infinite path π = π 0 π 1 . . . in C(λ) such that:
Proof. Let v ∈ V X and k ∈ N. Let ρ be a play in X such that ρ ∈ λ(v) and ρ 0 = v. We build the corresponding infinite path π in C(λ) iteratively as follows: Let π 0 := v C . Let n ∈ N, n ≥ 1. Suppose that π <n has been already constructed, we show how to choose π n .
As ρ is a play in X , we clearly have (v 
Thus, there exists a player i such that c
and c 
is an edge in E X . Furthermore, the play ρ is λ-consistent: Assume, towards contradiction, that it is not. Thus, there exists n ∈ N and i ∈ Π such that ρ n ∈ V X i and Cost i (ρ ≥n ) > λ(ρ n ). Consider now π n and the value c i of the counter for player i at this vertex. Since ρ n ∈ V X i , we know that c i ≤ λ(ρ n ). From this vertex, the counter value for player i decreases at least by 1 at each step along π ≥n . and hits the value 0 before λ(ρ n ) steps. However, this means that in ρ ≥n , player i sees his objective sooner than expected and the cost is less than λ(ρ n ), which is a contradiction.
◭
Since the edge relation E C in the counter graph respects the edge relation E X in the extended game, the region decomposition of a path in X given in Lemma 9 can also be applied to a path in C(λ). We will often use such path region decompositions in the proofs of this section.
In order to prove the PSPACE membership for the constraint problem, we need to show that the counter graph C(λ * ), with λ * the fixpoint function computed by Algorithm 1, has an exponential size. To this end it is enough to show an exponential upper bound on the maximal finite range mR(λ * ) of λ * . We proceed in two steps: First, with the next proposition, given a labeling function λ and its restriction λ ≥ℓ to V ≥ℓ , we exhibit a bound on the supremum of the cost of λ-consistent plays for each player, in terms of the maximal finite range mR(λ ≥ℓ ). Second, we consider the actual sequence of functions (λ k ) k∈N defined in Definitions 13 and 15, as implemented by Algorithm 1. With Theorem 34, we show that mR(λ * ) is bounded by an exponential in the size of the original game G. The proof is by induction on k and uses Proposition 32.
◮ Proposition 32 (Bound on finite supremum). Let λ be a labeling function. Let
Before proving Proposition 32, we need the following technical lemma:
Let π be a finite prefix of a valid path in C(λ) such that:
Proof sketch. The full proof of this lemma is quite technical, so we give here the main ideas and refer to the full proof for more details. Suppose now that at vertex π[n] 0 , there exists a counter value c i for some player i that is neither 0 nor +∞. This means that there was a constraint for player i initialized in a previous section π[n ′ ], with n ′ < n, that has carried over to π[n] 0 , via decrements of at least 1 per step. We know that the initial finite counter value is bounded by mR(λ n ′ ), and appeared before the end of section π[n ′ ]. Thus the length from the end of section π[n ′ ] to the end of section π[n] is bounded by mR(λ n ′ ), as again, once the counter value attains 0 for player i, the path π has entered the next section.
Therefore, considering the possible cases for each section, we can bound the total length of π as follows:
Finally, remark that by I-monotonicity, it is actually the case that only (and at most) |Π| different sections can appear in the decomposition of π. Furthermore, for each n ∈ {ℓ + 1, . . . , N }, we have mR(λ n ) ≤ mR(λ >ℓ ) by Definition 26. Thus, we have the following bound:
which is the bound stated in Lemma 33. ◭ Proof of Lemma 33. Let v C be a starting vertex in SV(λ). Let π be a finite prefix of a valid path in C(λ) such that:
The following proof is quite technical, thus we alleviate some of the difficulties by proving a first upper bound on the length of finite paths without cycles in C(λ), then by showing how to obtain the desired bound. The main idea is to bound iteratively the length of prefixes of π, adding at each step of the reasoning the section for the next region traversed by π.
Let π ′ be a valid path in C(λ) such that π is a prefix of π ′ . By Lemma 9, we know that there exist two natural numbers ℓ, m ′ ≤ N and m ′ − ℓ (possibly empty) paths π ′ℓ , . . . , π 
By Lemma 31, there exist a corresponding λ-consistent play ρ ′ in X and a corresponding history ρ. Furthermore, since π contains no cycle, the sections π[n] do not either.
We first treat the case where m < m ′ . We first bound the length of the first section π [ℓ] .
Suppose 0 < λ(v) < +∞. In that case, we know that along ρ ′ , which is λ-consistent, player i reaches his target after at most λ(v) steps. Thus, there exists n ≤ m is in section π ′ [ℓ], then it means that a counter value for some player i has become finite along the first |V | + 1 vertices of π ′ [ℓ]. Let t be the first index it does so along π ′ [ℓ] . By the same argument as in the previous case, we know that from π ′ [ℓ] t , there is at most mR(λ ℓ ) vertices before entering the next section of π ′ . Thus, we obtain that:
If ℓ = m, we can already conclude that:
Suppose now that ℓ < m. We show that for each n > ℓ, we have: 
If w ∈ V i , it means that either the counter value c i is equal to λ(w) or has decreased since a vertex (w ′ , (c If m = ℓ + 1, we are done.
Suppose now that m > ℓ + 1. Let n be such that ℓ + 1 < n ≤ m. Assume that for each n ′ < n, it holds that
We 
we obtain that:
If w ∈ V i , it means that either the counter value c i is equal to λ(w) or has decreased since a vertex (w ′ , (c
If |π[n]| ≤ mR(λ n ), we can conclude that:
If |π[n]| ≤ mR(λ n ′ ), we can conclude that:
Suppose now that for every player i, his counter value c i at π[n] 0 = (w, (c i ) i∈Π ) is either 0 or +∞. In that case, we are in a similar case than for section π[ℓ], thus we can conclude that |π[n]| ≤ |v| + mR(λ n ). Thus, we have indeed:
and thus finally:
Assume now that m = m ′ . In that case, we cannot rely on the section π ′m to be finite, as the play ρ ′ never reaches another region. However, in this situation, it is guaranteed that the counter values in π ′m are fixed and are equal to either 0 or +∞: indeed, a finite counter value would imply that some player i such that i ∈ J m reaches his target in ρ ′ exactly when his counter value becomes 0 in π ′ . But π ′m is the last section of ρ ′ , thus no new region is reached after J m and no new player can see his objective than the players i ∈ J m . Therefore, finite prefix of π ′m that contains no cycle has its length bounded by |V |. Thus, we can conclude:
In fact, the bound given above can be slightly changed to give the desired bound. Indeed, the bound above relies on the fact that m ≤ N and covers the case where a path traverses every region from J ℓ to J N . In all generality, the number N of different regions can be exponential in the number |Π| of players. However, by the I-monotonicity property, we know that a path can actually traverse at most |Π| regions. Thus, in the region decomposition of a path, only (and at most) |π| sections are relevant and of length greater than 0. Therefore, we can define a subsequence of indices (n r ) r≤|π| , with n 1 = ℓ, such that in fact
Hence, we obtain the following bound on the length t of π:
Finally, as for every r ≤ |π|, r > 1, we have mR(λ nr ) ≤ mR(λ >ℓ ), we obtain the desired bound:
◭
We are now ready to prove Proposition 32.
Proof of Proposition 32. Let v ∈ V
X with I(v) = J ℓ and i ∈ Π be such that there exists c ∈ N with sup {Cost i (ρ) | ρ ∈ Λ(v)} = c.
If i ∈ J ℓ , then c = 0, as every play starting in v has a cost 0 for player i. Hence the statement of Proposition 32 trivially holds.
Suppose now that i / ∈ J ℓ . Consider ρ ∈ Λ k (v) such that Cost i (ρ) = c < +∞. As player i eventually reaches his target set along ρ, this means that ρ eventually leaves region J ℓ and eventually reaches another region J n such that i ∈ J n . Consider the prefix ρ ≤c of ρ of length c. 
Notice that π[m]
consists only of one vertex corresponding to ρ c , and that for every n < m, we have i / ∈ J n . Suppose that π contains a cycle. By construction of C(λ), this cycle is included in one single section π[n], where n < m (as π [m] contains only one vertex), and thus i / ∈ J n . Consider the infinite path π ′ in C(λ) that follows π until the cycle and then repeats the cycle forever. By Lemma 31, there exists a corresponding λ-consistent play ρ ′ in X . We have Cost i (ρ ′ ) = +∞ for player i, as ρ ′ never reaches a region where player i reaches his target set. This is a contradiction with the fact that sup {Cost i (ρ) | ρ ∈ Λ(v)} = c is finite.
Therefore π contains no cycle, and by Lemma 33,
Since |π| = c = Cost i (ρ), we obtain the statement of Proposition 32. 
and also:
In particular for the global fixpoint λ * we have
Proof sketch. We follow the bottom-up order of Algorithm 1 to prove the local bounds on mR(λ 
Notice that the maximal finite range on V J ℓ can only increase from step k to step k + 1 if the value of a vertex v ∈ V J ℓ went from +∞ to a finite value c > 0. Furthermore, note that this increase can only happen at steps k > k * ℓ+1 . By Proposition 32, we have that, for every
Since the number of vertices in each region of the extended game X is bounded by the number of vertices |V | in the original game G, this increase phenomenon can happen at most at |V | many steps in the computation of the fixpoint values on region V J ℓ . Thus, we can focus on the (at most) |V | induction steps where an increase actually occurs. The induction hypothesis on k is that mR(λ
, where n is the number of increasing steps up to step k. Together with the bound mR(λ * >ℓ ) on already treated regions, it allows us to bound the sum given by Inequality (12) and obtain the desired bound for step k + 1. As the number of increases is at most |V |, at the stabilizing step k * ℓ for region V J ℓ we obtain:
Furthermore, as for every
, we also obtain that mR(λ
. Finally, with ℓ = 1, as |J 1 | ≤ |Π|, we get the following bound on the maximal finite range mR(λ * )(= mR(λ Let ℓ ∈ {1, . . . , N }. We show that mR(λ Suppose now that J ℓ is not a bottom region.
Induction hypothesis: We assume that for every ℓ ′ such that ℓ < ℓ ′ ≤ N , the following bound is true:
Induction on the number of steps in Algorithm 1:
We now proceed to prove the desired bound for J ℓ by induction on the number k of iterations of the algorithm.
First, recall Definition 15, which specifies how to update λ k+1 according to the values of λ:
Thus, we have i ∈ J ℓ for the player i that owns vertex v, and thus we also have λ
In particular this holds for every successor v ′ of v in X. Thus, we have, for every k > 0:
and thus immediately:
As this holds for every v ∈ V J ℓ , we have mR(λ 
Thus, by Proposition 32, we obtain:
As mR(λ
ℓ ) = 0, we have:
By (13) and as (
And thus,
Hence we obtain, as |Π \ J ℓ | ≥ 1:
Induction Hypothesis: Let n ≤ m, n > 0. Assume that for every n ′ < n, n ′ > 0, we have:
If k = j n for every n ≤ m and k < j m , then we know that there exists n ′ < m, n ′ > 1, such that j n ′ < k < j n ′ +1 . Furthermore, we have that mR(λ k ℓ ) ≤ mR(λ j n ′ ℓ ). Thus, by the induction hypothesis (15), we have:
If k = j n for some 1 < n ≤ m, then we can bound the values of λ
If λ jn−1 (v) = +∞, then we immediately have: 
The sum above can be decomposed as follows:
As we have j n−1 ≤ (j n ) − 1 < j n , we know that mR(λ
), thus, we obtain by the induction hypothesis (15):
And thus we have:
By (17):
By (18):
By (19) and (20), we obtain:
That is:
Hence we get:
Finally, since n ≤ |V |:
. Finally, as |J 1 | ≤ |Π|, for the global fixpoint λ * we have:
The next corollary is a direct consequence of Theorem 34.
◮ Corollary 35. The counter graph C(λ * ) has a size |C(λ * )| exponential in the size of the game G.
We conclude this section with two other corollaries that we be useful in the next section.
◮ Corollary 36. For every k ∈ N and region V J ℓ , we have
and also
Proof. Let k ∈ N. Using the terminology of the proof of Theorem 34, we know that there exists n ≤ |V |, such that mR(λ k ℓ ) ≤ mR(λ jn ℓ ). Assume, without loss of generality, that J ℓ is not a bottom region. By inequality (22) in the same proof, we know that:
Thus, we have:
As n ≤ |V |, we obtain:
Then, the following holds:
Then, by Proposition 32, we know that:
Using the terminology of the proof of Theorem 34, we know that there exists n ≤ |V |, such that mR(λ k ℓ ) ≤ mR(λ jn ℓ ). By inequalities (19) and 20 in the same proof, we obtain that:
and thus:
PSPACE completeness
In this section, we prove Theorem 4. We first prove that the constraint problem is in PSPACE and then that it is PSPACE-hard.
PSPACE easyness
The purpose of this section is to prove that determining if, given a reachability game (G,v 0 ) and two thresholds x, y ∈ (N ∪ {+∞}) |Π| , there exists an SPE σ in this game such that for all i ∈ Π, x i ≤ Cost i ( σ v0 ) ≤ y i can be done in PSPACE (see Theorem 4).
◮ Proposition 38. The constraint problem for quantitative reachability games is in PSPACE.
Let us provide a high level sketch of the proof of our PSPACE procedure for this constraint problem. Thanks to Theorem 20, solving the constraint problem reduced in finding a λ * -consistent play ρ in (X , x 0 ) satisfying the constraints. By Lemmas 30 and 31, the latter problem reduces in finding a valid path ρ C in the counter graph C(λ * ), satisfying the constraints. Roughly speaking, in order to solve our initial problem, it suffices to decide the existence of a valid path that is a lasso and satisfies the constraints in the counter graph, which is exponential in the size of our original input (by Corollary 35). Classical arguments, using Savitch's Theorem can thus be used to prove the PSPACE membership. Nevertheless, the detailed proof is more intricate for two reasons. The first reason is that the counter graph is based on the labeling function λ * . We thus also have to prove that the labeling function λ * can be computed in PSPACE. The second reason is that, a priori, although we know that the counter graph is of exponential size, we do not know explicitly its size. This is problematic when using classical NPSPACE algorithms that guess some path in a graph of exponential size, where a counter bounded by the size of the graph is needed to guarantee the termination of the procedure. In order to overcome this, we also need a PSPACE procedure to obtain the actual size of the counter graph.
The whole procedure works by induction on k, the steps in the computation of the labeling function λ * . Moreover, it exploits the structural evolution of the local fixpoints formalized in Proposition 17 and especially in Lemma 18. Let X J ℓ be a region, we aim at
) be the step where the fixpoint is reached for region We proceed by induction on the step k ∈ N of the algorithm and, once a step is fixed, we proceed region by region, beginning with the bottom region J N and then proceeding bottom-up by following the total order on I.
In the following proof" we have to deal with regions of the form X J but we only have the game G in input. Clearly, as there are at most |V | vertices of the form (v, J) we can recover and encode the arena X J in polynomial size memory.
Proof of Proposition 39.
We proceed by induction on k ∈ N.
For k = 0, we have to prove that for all J ℓ ∈ I (for some ℓ ∈ {1, . . . , N }):
J ℓ } and mR(λ k ≥ℓ ) can be both computed in PSPACE. Let J ℓ ∈ I, thanks to Definition 13, we have that either λ 0 (v) = 0 if v ∈ V i and i ∈ J ℓ or λ 0 (v) = +∞ otherwise. So, we only have to check if i ∈ J ℓ and this can be done in PSPACE. Finally, mR(λ 0 ≥l ) = 0 because we are at the initial step. Now, assume that for all 0 ≤ n ≤ k, for all J ℓ ∈ I (for some ℓ ∈ {1, . . . , N }) the set {λ n (v) | v ∈ V J ℓ } and the value mR(λ n ≥ℓ ) can be computed in PSPACE. And we prove that it remains true for n = k + 1.
We proceed by induction on the region
, and we know that this latter set can be computed in PSPACE. Moreover, as J N is a bottom region, we have that mR(λ k+1 ≥N ) = mR(λ k+1 N ) = 0. Now, let J ℓ ∈ I be a region different of J N . If it is a bottom region, the previous arguments hold. Otherwise, we assume that we know (i) {λ k (v) | v ∈ V J ℓ }, and we can store it in polynomial size memory (ii) by induction hypothesis, we can compute {λ Figure 4 ) and we prove that we can compute
First, let us recall that thanks to Proposition 17, we know that Algorithm 1 reaches for each region a local fixpoint. We denote by k * ℓ (resp. k * ℓ+1 ), the step after which the region X J ℓ (resp. X J ℓ+1 ) has reached its fixpoint. Moreover, we know that k *
, then by Proposition 17 the region J ℓ+1 has not reached his local fixpoint yet. So, it implies that the values of the vertices in J ℓ have not change since initialization (see Lemma 18) If k * ℓ+1 < k ≤ k * ℓ , the step k+1 of the iterative computation of the operator λ corresponds to a step during which the value of λ for the vertices in V J ℓ can change or if k = k * ℓ we realize that the fixpoint is effectively reached. The fixed point is reached for all the regions J ′ > J ℓ and is not reached yet for J ℓ . This is the most difficult case of this induction.
We know by Corollary 36 that for all v ∈ V J ℓ the value λ k+1 is at most exponential in the size of the input. It remains to prove that sup{Cost i (ρ) | ρ ∈ Λ k (v ′ )} can be computed in PSPACE. In order to prove this we need to guess lassoes of length at most 2 · |C(λ
(Because a path beginning in X J ℓ will only reach vertices in X ≥J ℓ so we only have to consider the part of the counter graph which correspond to X ≥J ℓ .) We know by induction hypothesis that we can compute K in PSPACE and that its value is at most exponential in the size of the input (Corollary 36), so we can encode K with a polynomial space memory.
We proceed as follows: first recall by Corollary 22 that
We guess this value M , for which we know that either M = +∞ or M = c < +∞. We first test if M = +∞, and then if M = c.
If M = +∞: by Proposition 21, we can find a lasso π = hg ω of length at most 2 ·|C(λ
X is the corresponding λ k -consistent play in the extended game, then Cost i (ρ) = +∞. To guess π we need to know the values of λ k for all vertices v ∈ X ≥J ℓ . It is not possible to maintain all these values in memory because there is maybe an exponential number of them. So, we have to proceed in a smarter way. We know by Lemma 9 that π can be decomposed according to the regions, i.e.,
for some t ∈ {ℓ, . . . , N }, where possibly some sections are empty. So, we first guess the first vertex of g, the vertex on which there will be a cycle. And then we guess successively π [ℓ] , π[ℓ + 1] and so on. Additionally, we keep a counter C L (which is initialized to 0 and incremented by 1 each time we guess a new vertex of π) and a counter C T (which is equal to 0 as long as player i does not reach his target set and is equal to 1 after that).
is not empty, we only have to keep in memory its predecessor (v, J n , (c i ) i∈Π ) (with n ≤ m) and to know the value of λ
≥ℓ )| and C T = 0, we have found a good lasso i.e., one such that player i does not reach his target set along its corresponding play in the extended game. To summarize, during this procedure we only keep in memory: (i) the vertex on which the lasso will loop; (ii) the vertex we are guessing and its predecessor; 
If d is equal to the value M that we have guessed, then we have guessed the good maximum. To guess the different lassoes π, we proceed as for the case M = +∞ but we keep an additionnal counter C which keeps track of the cost of player i for the lasso (and so indirectly for the corresponding play in the extended game) that we are guessing. But, once again, this value is at most exponential in the size of the input.
This conclude the proof that {λ 
We can compute {λ We are now able to prove Propisition 38.
Proof of Proposition 38. Let (G, v 0 ) be an initialized reachability game and let x, y ∈ (N ∪ {+∞}) |Π| be two thresholds. Let (X , x 0 ) be its extended game with x 0 = (v 0 , I 0 ). Let C(λ * ≥I0 ) be the counter graph restricted to the arena X ≥I0 and so |C(λ *
). Let us recall that K 0 can be computed (resp. encoded) in PSPACE thanks to Proposition 39 (resp. Corollary 36).
We have to guess a lasso π = hg ω in the counter graph C(λ * ≥I0 ) such that its corresponding play ρ X in the extended game satisfies the constraints, i.e.,
The length L of π is at most max(max{y i | y i < +∞}, |C(λ * ≥I0 )|) + 2 · |C(λ * ≥I0 )| as the cycle of π can appear after the constraints y i < +∞ are satisfied.
In order to have a PSPACE procedure, we cannot guess π entirely and we have to proceed region by region. If I 0 = J ℓ for some ℓ ∈ {1, . . . , N }, we consider the region decomposition π [ℓ] 
Thanks to Proposition 39, we can obtain this set in polynomial size memory and once we move to another region, we can forget this set and compute the new one.
Additionally, we have a counter C L to count the length of π and for each player i ∈ Π we have a counter C i keeping track the current cost of player i along π. For all i ∈ Π, we have that C i , C L ≤ L. Henceforth, all these counters can be encoded with polynomial size memory. Moreover, in addition to these counters, we currently maintain: (i) the first vertex of g, (ii) the current vertex we are guessing, (iii) its predecessor and, (iv) the set {λ * (v) | v ∈ V Jm } (only |V | values which can be encoded in polynomial size memory by Corollary 36) if we are guessing π [m] . As for (ii) and (iii) a vertex in the counter graph is composed of a vertex of V , a subset I of Π and |Π| counter values which are at most exponential in the input (Corollary 36), all this procedure can be done in PSPACE. ◭
PSPACE hardness
We now prove that the constraint problem is PSPACE-hard for quantitative reachability games.
◮ Proposition 40. The constraint problem for quantitative reachability games is PSPACEhard.
The proof of this proposition is based on a polynomial reduction from the QBF problem which is PSPACE-complete. It is close to the proof given in [10] for the PSPACE-hardness of the constraint problem for Boolean games with reachability objectives -either a player reaches his objective or not. The main difference is here to manipulate costs instead of considering qualitative reachability.
The QBF problem is to decide whether a fully quantified Boolean formula ψ is true. The formula ψ can be assumed to be in prenex normal form . . ∧ C n be a fully quantified Boolean formula in prenex normal form. We build the following quantitative reachability game G ψ = (Π, V, (V i ) i∈Π , E, (Cost i ) i∈Π , (F i ) i∈Π ) (see Figure 5 ):
the set V of vertices: for each variable x k ∈ X under quantifier Q k , there exist vertices x k , ¬x k and q k ; for each clause C k , there exist vertices c k and t k ; there exists an additional vertex t n+1 ; the set E of edges: from each vertex q k there exist an edge to x k and an edge to ¬x k ; from each vertex x k and ¬x k , there exists an edge to q k+1 , except for k = m where this edge is to c 1 ; from each vertex c k , there exist an edge to t k and an edge to c k+1 , except for k = n where there exist an edge to t n and an edge to t n+1 ; there exists a loop on each t k ; the set Π of n + 2 players: each player i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, owns vertex c i ; player n + 1 (resp. n + 2) is the player who owns the vertices q i for each existential (resp. universal) quantifier Q i ; as all other vertices have only one outgoing edge, it does not matter which player owns them; each function Cost i is associated with the target set F i defined as follows:
for all i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, F i = {ℓ ∈ V | ℓ is a literal of clause C i } ∪ {t i }; F n+1 = {t n+1 }; F n+2 = {t 1 , . . . , t n }. (⇒) Suppose that ψ is true. Then there exists a sequence f of functions f k : {0, 1} k−1 → {0, 1}, with k odd, 1 ≤ k ≤ m, such that for all sequences g of functions g k : {0, 1} k−1 → {0, 1}, with k even, 1 ≤ k ≤ m, the valuation ν f,g evaluates φ(X) to true. We define a strategy profile σ as follows:
for player n + 1, his strategy σ n+1 is the strategy corresponding to the sequence f (by Remark 41); for player n + 2, his strategy is an arbitrary strategy σ n+2 ; we denote by g the corresponding sequence g k : {0, 1} k−1 → {0, 1}, with k even, 1 ≤ k ≤ m (by Remark 41);
for each player i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, if hv ∈ Hist i (q 1 ) with v = c i , is consistent with σ n+1 , then σ i (hv) = c i+1 if i = n and t n+1 otherwise else σ i (hv) = t i .
Let us first prove that the play ρ = σ q1 has a cost ≤ x = (2 · m, . . . , 2 · m, 2 · m + n, +∞). By hypothesis, the valuation ν f,g evaluates φ(X) to true, that is, it evaluates all clauses C i to true. Hence by Remark 41, ρ visits a vertex of F i for all i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, and by definition of σ, ρ eventually loops on t n+1 . It follows that Cost i (ρ) ≤ 2 · m for all i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, Cost n+1 (ρ) ≤ 2 · m + n, and Cost n+2 (ρ) = +∞. Hence Cost(ρ) ≤ x.
Let us now prove that σ is an SPE, that is, for each history hv ∈ Hist(q 1 ), there is no one-shot deviating strategy in the subgame (G ψ↾h , v) that is profitable to the player who owns vertex v (by Proposition 6). This is clearly true for all v = t i , 1 ≤ i ≤ n + 1, since t i has only one outgoing edge. For the other vertices v, we study two cases:
hv is consistent with σ n+1 : Notice that hv is maybe not consistent with σ n+2 , but with another arbitrary strategy σ by Remark 41. By hypothesis, the valuation ν f,g ′ evaluates φ(X) to true. Hence as explained previously for σ q1 , the cost of play ρ = h σ ↾h v is such that Cost i (ρ) ≤ 2 · m for all i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, Cost n+1 (ρ) ≤ 2 · m + n, and Cost n+2 (ρ) = +∞. If v belongs to player i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, this player has no incentive to deviate since he has already visited his target set along h and thus cannot decrease his cost. If v belongs to player n + 1, a one-shot deviation will lead to a play eventually looping on t 1 by definition of σ, thus leading to a cost +∞ which is not profitable for player n + 1. Finally if v belongs to player n + 2, a one-shot deviation will not decrease his cost by definition of σ (σ n+2 is arbitrary). hv is not consistent with σ n+1 : Suppose that v = c k . Then by definition of σ, the play h σ ↾h v eventually loops on t k leading to a cost ≤ 2 · m + k for player k. In fact, if player k has already seen his target set along hv, using a one-shot deviation in the subgame (G ψ↾h , v) leads to the same cost for him. Otherwise, it leads to a cost equal to +∞: indeed, deviating here means going to the state c k+1 (or t n+1 if k = n, which leads to a cost of +∞ for player n), and since hv is not consistent with σ n+1 , by definition of σ k+1 , player k + 1 will choose to go to t k+1 . This player has thus no incentive to deviate. Suppose that v = q k . Then by definition of σ, the play ρ = h σ ↾h v eventually loops on t 1 . It follows that Cost n+1 (ρ) = +∞ and Cost n+2 (ρ) = 2 · m + 1. Due to the structure of the game graph, 2 · m + 1 is the smallest cost that player n + 2 is able to obtain. So if q k ∈ V n+2 , player n + 2 has no incentive to deviate. And if q k ∈ V n+1 , player n + 1 could try to use a one-shot deviating strategy, however the resulting play still eventually loops on t 1 .
This proves that σ is an SPE and we already showed that its cost was bounded by x.
(⇐) Suppose that there exists an SPE σ in (G ψ , q 1 ) with outcome ρ such that Cost(ρ) ≤ x. In particular Cost n+1 (ρ) < +∞. By Remark 41, it follows that Cost n+2 (ρ) = +∞. We have to prove that ψ is true. To this end, consider the sequence f of functions f k : {0, 1} k−1 → {0, 1}, with k odd, 1 ≤ k ≤ m, that corresponds to strategy σ n+1 of player n + 1 by Remark 41. Let us show that for all sequences g of functions g k : {0, 1} k−1 → {0, 1}, with k even, 1 ≤ k ≤ m, the valuation ν f,g evaluates φ(X) to true.
By contradiction assume that it is not the case for some sequence g ′ and consider the related strategy σ ′ n+2 of player n + 2 by Remark 41. Notice that σ ′ n+2 is a finitely deviating strategy. Let us consider the outcome ρ ′ of the strategy profile (σ ′ n+2 , σ −(n+2) ) from q 1 . As Cost n+2 (ρ) = +∞, we must have Cost n+2 (ρ ′ ) = +∞, otherwise σ ′ n+2 is a profitable deviation for player n + 2 whereas σ is an SPE. It follows that Cost n+1 (ρ ′ ) < +∞ by Remark 41, that is, ρ ′ eventually loops on t n+1 . Now recall that the valuation ν f,g ′ evaluates φ(X) to false, which means that it evaluates some clause C k of φ(X) to false. Consider the history hc k < ρ ′ . As strategy σ ′ n+2 only acts on the left part of the underlying graph of G ψ , we have ρ ′ = σ ′ n+2 , σ −(n+2) q1 = h σ ↾h c k . In the subgame (G ψ↾h , c k ), the outcome of σ ↾h gives a cost of +∞ to player k because ρ ′ = h σ ↾h c k does not visit t k and ν f,g ′ evaluates C k to false. In this subgame, player k has thus a profitable one-shot deviation that consists to move to t k . It follows that σ is not an SPE which is impossible. Then ψ is true.
◭
